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CRIMINAL RESTITUTION OBLIGATIONS AS DEBTS UNDER
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
INTRODUCTION

The Bankruptcy Code (Code)I was enacted by Congress to aid debtors
and creditors and to give debtors a financial "fresh start." 2 In the case of
an individual debtor, this fresh start consists of discharging that debtor's
obligations.3 However, the obligations must first be "debts" under the
Bankruptcy Code.
In state criminal courts, a convicted offender may be granted probation4 subject entirely to the discretion of the sentencing court.5 In grant-

ing probation, the court will often impose conditions meant to
rehabilitate the offender without incarceration. 6 One available condition
is that the offender compensate the victim through restitution payments."
These federal and state interests conflict when a convicted offender petitions for bankruptcy8 and a discharge of his debts, including his restitutionary obligation. The majority of courts have held that this criminal
restitution obligation is not a debt.9
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982).
2. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 117 [hereinafter cited as House Report], reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6078. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
3. House Report, supra note 2, at 128, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5963, 6089.
4. Probation, in the case of a violation of state criminal law, is governed by state
statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) is the parallel federal statute.
5. Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 Geo. LJ. 809, 811-12
(1963); see D. Dressier, Practice and Theory of Probation and Parole 241 (2d ed. 1969).
See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
6. D. Dressier, supra note 5, at 16; Best & Birzon, supra note 5, at 809. See infra
notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
7. D. Dressier, supra note 5, at 241; Deming, CorrectionalRestitution: A Strategy
for CorrectionalConflict Management, 40 Fed. Probation, Sept. 1976, at 27. See infra
notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
8. An individual debtor with a voluntary petition may choose from two types of
bankruptcy: liquidation under chapter 7 in a "straight bankruptcy case," where all the
debtor's property becomes part of his estate and is discharged pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 727 (1982), or a plan for repayment under chapters 11 or 13, where the debtor outlines
a plan, approved by the court, to pay back debts over a period of time. I Jordan & W.
Warren, Bankruptcy 21 (1985). In the issue at hand, the debtor is seeking a discharge of
debts under chapter 7.
9. Cases that hold that a criminal restitution obligation is not a debt include: In re
Oslager, 46 Bankr. 58, 61 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985); In re George G. Solar Co., 44 Bankr.
828, 830 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); In re Vik, 45 Bankr. 64, 67 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984);
In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614, 616-17 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Magnifico, 21 Bankr.
800, 803 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982); People v. Washburn, 97 Cal. App. 3d 621, 626, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 822, 825 (1979); State v. Eyre, 39 Wash. App. 141, 145, 692 P.2d 853, 855 (1984).
Cases that hold that a criminal restitution obligation is a debt include: In re Robinson,
776 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1985), cert grantedsub nom. Kelly v. Robinson, 106 S.Ct.
1181 (1986); In re Brown, 39 Bankr. 820, 826 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Newton,
15 Bankr. 708, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981). The Newton court held that a criminal
restitution obligation was a debt but later found it to be a nondischargeable debt.
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This Note concludes that a criminal restitution obligation should be
considered a debt under the Bankruptcy Code. Part I discusses the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code and restitution as a condition of
probation. Part II examines the Bankruptcy Code and its provisions and
argues that restitution is a debt contemplated by the Code. In addition,
Part II analyzes the tensions between the Code and the state's interest in
enforcing its criminal Jaws and concludes that a discharge does not unduly frustrate a state's interest. Part III examines the federal/state conflict under the principles of Younger v. Harris and the supremacy clause,
which mandate that bankruptcy preempt state laws.
I.

BANKRUPTCY AND RESTITUTION AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION

A.

Bankruptcy

The Bankruptcy Code'0 aims to rehabilitate the debtor I and to give
him a "new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, un2
hampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt."'
The Code gives debtors a fresh start by relieving their financial burdens.' 3 Thus, bankruptcy is a debtor's remedy,' 4 which should be con10. Bankruptcy law is enacted pursuant to the Constitution, which states that Congress has the power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Initially, bankruptcy law was
exclusively a creditor's remedy that provided for equitable distribution of the debtor's
assets to his creditors. See I Collier on Bankruptcy 1 1.02 (15th ed. 1985); R. Jordan &
W. Warren, supra note 8, at 20. The original Bankruptcy Code was constructed in 1898,
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, and was last overhauled in 1938. Act of June
22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840; see S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 [hereinafter
cited as Senate Report], reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5788. The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 repealed the former Act and sought to modernize and
upgrade the existing bankruptcy laws due to the steady growth of bankruptcies, particularly consumer bankruptcies. See Senate Report, supra, at 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5788-89.
Title 11 of the United States Code sets out the substantive law of bankruptcy in the
Bankruptcy Code. Senate Report, supra, at 3, reprintedin 1978 Code Cong. & Ad. News
5787; 5789. Provisions applicable here include chapter I (general provisions), chapter 3
(case administration) and chapter 5 (creditors, debtors and estates), which apply to all
other chapters. Senate Report, supra, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5787, 5789. Petitions for bankruptcy are filed under the operative chapters, including chapter 7 (liquidation), chapter 9 (adjustment of municipality debts) or chapter 11
(reorganization). Senate Report, supra, at 3, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5787, 5789.
11. "Debtor" is a "person or municipality concerning which a case under this title
has been commenced." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1982).
12. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
13. Id.; see Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (quotingLocal Loan Co., 292
U.S. at 244); In re Vickers, 577 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1978); Appeal of Moynagh, 560
F.2d 1028, 1030 (1st Cir. 1977); In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1003 (2d Cir. 1976); In re
Norman, 25 Bankr. 545, 547 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982); In re Hoover, 14 Bankr. 592, 596
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981), affid, 38 Bankr. 325 (N.D. Ohio 1983); House Report, supra
note 2, at 117, 128, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6078, 6089.
14. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was promulgated in the wake of "a swing of
the pendulum from'the spirit of creditor protection to the spirit of debtor protection in
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strued in favor of the debtor. 5
When a debtor fies for bankruptcy, the collection of debts from the
debtor is automatically stayed, 6 giving the debtor a "breathing spell"
from harassment by creditors. 7 All debts are then discharged unless expressly excepted.1 8 For certain exceptions, the creditor has the burden of
objecting to discharge within the context of the bankruptcy proceeding.1 9

A discharge voids any judgment of liability against the debtor with respect to the discharged debt.2'

B. Restitution as a Condition of Probation
Probation, under state law, is a treatment program inwhich the court
suspends final action in an adjudicated offender's case. He remains at
liberty, subject to conditions imposed by a court, and is supervised by a
probation worker. 2 The goal of probation is rehabilitating the offender
without incarceration2 2 and readjusting him to society.3 It is a discretionary24 judicial act.2" In deciding on probation, the court must take a
case-by-case approach, considering the background and individual circumstances of each offender so that the conditions of probation best accomplish rehabilitation.2 6
Conditions of probation generally are intended to aid in rehabilitating
the offender, 27 reintegrating him into the community2" and encouraging
the legal age of the consumer." Ginsberg, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-A Pri.

mer, 28 DePaul L. Rev. 923, 923 (1979); see R. Jordan & W. Warren, supra note 8, at 20.
15. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. 1 1984).
17. Senate Report, supra note 10, at 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5787, 5840; see R. Jordan & W. Warren, supra note 8, at 22.
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982). "Except as provided in section 523 ...a discharge
under subsection (a) of this section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose beforc
the date of the order for relief under this chapter ....
" Id. (emphasis added).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (Supp. I 1984). See infra note 75.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (1982); see 3 Collier on Bankruptcy
524.01 (15th ed.
1985).
21. D. Dressier, supra note 5, at 16. Probation involves three stages: the presentation
of a pre-sentence report to the court, the suspension of sentence under conditions imposed by the court, and the supervision of the probationer. Best & Birzon, supra note 5,
at 813-14.
22. See, e.g., La Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 895(A) (West 1984); N.Y. Penal Law
§ 65.10(1) (McKinney 1975); see also Best & Birzon, supra note 5, at 809-10.
23. See D. Dressier, supra note 5, at 236.
24. See e.g., Pub. Act No. 83-207, § 1,Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1985); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(1) (McKinney 1975); Va. Code § 19.2-303 (Supp.
1985); see also Best & Birzon, supra note 5, at 812-13.
25. Best & Birzon, supra note 5, at 809-10 n.3 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures 1 (1939)). Probation is not to be confused
with parole, which is imposed after incarceration and is an administrative act of an executive or executive agency. Id.
26. See D. Dressier, supra note 5, at 241; Best & Birzon, supra note 5, at 809.
27. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1986); Pub. Act No. 83-1047, § 1,
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); La. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 895(A) (West 1984); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.021(1) (Vernon 1979); N.Y. Penal
'
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him to lead a "law-abiding life."'2 9 Some states impose mandatory conditions such as remaining within the jurisdiction,3 reporting to a probation
officer,3 1 answering inquiries by the officer,3 2 paying costs to the state,"
and not committing another offense.3 4 Most states, however, allow sentencing courts broad discretion in imposing conditions tailored to the
individual offender and his circumstances, provided the conditions are
reasonable and achieve the rehabilitative purpose underlying the
statute.
Restitution as a condition of probation generally falls within the discretion of the sentencing court. 6 It provides for compensation of the
victim3 7 and rehabilitation of the offender by increasing the offender's
Law § 65.10(2) (McKinney Supp. 1986); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2951.02(C) (Page Supp.
1984); D. Dressier, supra note 5, at 241; Best & Birzon, supra note 5, at 810.
28. See D. Dressier, supra note 5, at 236.
29. See, e.g',
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1203(1) (1977); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 706-624 (1976
& Supp. 1984); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.030(1) (Michie 1985); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
17-A, § 1204(1) (1983); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2262(i) (1979); N.J. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:45-1(a) (West 1982); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(1) (McKinney 1975); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-1343(a) (1983); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9754(b) (Purdon 1982); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 28, § 252(a) (Supp. 1985).
30. See, e.g., Pub. Act No. 83-1047, § 1, Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(a)(4)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.3(1)(b) (West 1982); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(3)(b) (McKinney 1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(2) (Supp. 1985);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2951.02(C) (Page 1982 & Supp. 1984).
31. See, e.g., Pub. Act No. 83-1047, § 1, Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(a)(2)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.3(1)(c) (West 1982); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(3)(a) (McKinney 1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(3) (Supp. 1985).
32. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(3)(c) (McKinney 1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A1343(b)(3) (Supp. 1985).
33. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20-6 (Supp. 1985); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A1343(b)(6) (Supp. 1985).
34. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1203(1) (1977); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.030
(Michie 1985); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1204(1) (1983); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 771.3(l)(a) (West 1982).
35. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1986); Pub. Act. No. 83-1047,
§ 1, Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 533.030(1) (Michie 1985); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.021(1) (Vernon 1979); N.Y. Penal Law
§ 65.10(1) (McKinney 1975); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 252(a) (Supp. 1985); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 973.09(1)(a) (West 1985); see D. Dressier, supra note 5, at 241; Best & Birzon,
supra note 5, at 817-18.
36. Restitution is primarily an optional condition of probation, imposed at the court's
discretion. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-18-70 (1982); Pub. Act No. 83-1047, § 1, 111. Ann.
Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(b)(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A,
§ 1204(2-A)(B) (1983); Mich. Comp Laws Ann. § 771.3(2)(d) (West 1982); N.Y. Penal
Law § 65.10(2)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
A few states require that restitution be considered in cases where the victim has suffered monetary damages. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.030(3) (Michie 1985); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 973.09(1)(b) (West 1985). However, in most of these states, restitution will
not be ordered if the court finds valid reasons not to impose it. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 775.089(1)(a) (West Supp. 1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 973.09(1)(b) (West 1985).
37. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-2350, -2351 (Supp. 1985); La. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 895.1(B)(5) (West Supp. 1986); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1151(2) (1983);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(d) (Supp. 1985); Siegel, Court Ordered Victim-Restitution:
An Overview of Theory and Action, 5 New Eng. J. Prison L. 135, 135 (1979).
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awareness of the consequences of his actions.3" "Society wants to make
sure the offender realizes the enormity of his conduct, and it asks him to
demonstrate this by making amends to the individual most affected by
the defendant's depredations." 3 9 Restitution employs compensation of

the victim as a method of fostering the rehabilitative purposes of
probation.'
In imposing restitution, courts consider several factors. The sentencing court begins by determining the amount of the victim's loss, which
puts a ceiling on the amount of restitution.4 1 This amount is modified by
the offender's ability to pay.4 2
Thus, courts impose restitution when it will further rehabilitation and
will tailor the amount and methods to the circumstances of the offender,
making it a compensatory condition within the confines of rehabilitative
probation.

II. RESTITUTION AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION IS A
DISCHARGEABLE DEBT UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to give the debtor a
fresh start.13 Consequently, courts have held that its provisions should be
construed liberally in favor of the debtor, "lest its benefits be frittered
away by narrow formalistic interpretations which disregard the spirit and
the letter of the Act."" Ambiguities are generally resolved in favor of
the debtor.4 5
Under the Code, a debt is a "liability on a claim."4 6 A claim is a "right
to payment."'4 7 Although the Code does not define "right to payment,"
38. See State v. Bausch, 83 N.J. 425, 434, 416 A.2d 833, 838 (1980); State v. Barr, 99
Wash. 2d 75, 79, 658 P.2d 1247, 1249-50 (1983) (en banc); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A,

§ 1321 (1983); Deming, supra note 7, at 27.
39. D. Dressier, supra note 5, at 241.
40. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1321 (1983); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:62
comment on purpose (Supp. 1983); N.J. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2C:45-1 (West 1982), construed in State v. Bausch, 83 N.J. 425, 434, 416 A.2d 833, 838 (1980).
41. See, eg., Ga. Code Ann. § 17-14-9 (1982); Pub. Act No. 83-1061, § 1, I11.Ann.
Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
895.1(A) (West Supp. 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(d) (Supp. 1985); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 973.09Qm)(a) (West 1985).
42. See, eg., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.089(6) (Supp. 1986); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(2)(g)
(McKinney Supp. 1986); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-304(d) (1982). See infra note 79 and
accompanying text.
43. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
44. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 279 (1940); see Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934); In re Vickers, 577 F.2d 683, 686-87 (10th Cir.
1978); In re Lange, 39 Bankr. 483, 485 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984).
45. In re Lange, 39 Bankr. 483, 485 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984); In re Payne, 27 Bankr.
809, 817 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(1 1) (1982).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1982). The statute states, in pertinent part, that a claim is
a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured." Id. An alternate definition exists for claims created by a right to
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legislative comments maintain that "all legal obligations of the debtor"

are meant to be subject to the bankruptcy laws and the definition of claim

"permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court."48 Thus,

the Code places no restrictions on the origin of a claim, and encourages

courts to give the most comprehensive relief to debtors.4 9

Since the definition of debt depends on the definition of claim, the

terms are coextensive."0 Therefore, "debt" should be given the broadest
construction in favor of debtor relief.5 Since the definitions of "claim"
and "debt" are unrestricted, Congress showed no specific intent to exclude restitution obligations. 52 Moreover, because Congress specifically
enumerated the debts excepted from discharge in other sections of the
Code,5 3 rather than limiting the definitions of debt and claim, there
is no
54
reason to believe Congress intended to restrict these definitions.
Since a right to payment must be found before a claim can exist,"
consistency requires that a right to payment be given the same broad
interpretation as that of claim. Accordingly, when an offender is ordered
to make restitution, the victim holds a right to payment of this obligation, consistent with the broad construction of "claim" outlined by Congress. This right to payment manifests itself in several ways.
In most states, payments are made to the victim.56 Indeed, one puran equitable remedy for breach of performance, which is not relevant here. See id.
§ 101(4)(B).
48. House Report, supra note 2, at 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5963, 6266 (emphasis added); Senate Report, supra note 10, at 22, reprintedin 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5808.
49. See House Report, supra note 2, at 309, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5963, 6266; Senate Report, supra note 10, at 22, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 5787, 5808; see also In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
grantedsub nom. Kelly v. Robinson, 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986); In re Brown, 39 Bankr. 820,
822 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 743, 754-55 n.6
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Thomas, 12 Bankr. 432, 433 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1981).
50. Senate Report, supra note 10, at 23, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5787, 5809; see In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30, 36 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub
nom. Kelly v. Robinson, 106 S.Ct. 1181 (1986); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 11101.11 (15th
ed. 1985). Thus, the "creditor has a 'claim' against the debtor and the debtor owes a
'debt' to the creditor." Senate Report, supra note 10, at 23, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5809.
51. In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30, 36 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Kelly v.
Robinson, 106 S.Ct. 1181 (1986).
52. Id. at 38.
53. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727(b) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
54. In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30, 30 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub nom. Kelly v.
Robinson, 106 S.Ct. 1181 (1986).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1982).
56. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-603(c) (Supp. 1985); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 411203(2)(h) (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-204.5 (Supp. 1984); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 775.089(1)(a) (West Supp. 1986); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-35(7) (1985); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 25-28-2-2(a)(5) (Bums 1985); Iowa Code Ann. § 910.2 (West Supp. 1985); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.3(2)(d) (West 1982); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.021(2) (Vernon Supp.
1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:62(V) (Supp. 1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(d)
(Supp. 1985); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 991a (West 1986); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 1106(a)(h) (Purdon 1983); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(10) (1982); Vt. Stat. Ann, lit.
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pose of restitution is victim compensation,5 and in several states, compensating the victim is the primary goal.58 A few states give restitution
payments priority over the payment of any costs or fines to the state. 59
Thus, restitution payments remain separate from other obligations to
state agencies. Moreover, the amount of restitution ordered is limited by
the victim's actual loss." These factors indicate that the obligation for
restitution payments runs directly to the victim, giving the victim a right
to payment and thus a claim within the broad construction of the Bankruptcy Code.

Another manifestation of a right to payment is that restitution obligations are related to an underlying debt of the offender to the victim.

Although payments to the victim do not jeopardize the victim's right to
seek a civil judgment of liability, any civil award must be reduced by the
amount of restitution already paid during probation.6" New Jersey

courts have even held that it is preferable that restitution be made in the

context of probation, if feasible, rather than through a civil judgment.62
If states consider obligations in the probationary context intertwined
with those in the civil context, a relationship exists between the offender
and the victim. The victim has a right to payment from the offender.6 3
Because the Code requires a broad interpretation of right to payment,
regardless of origin, the victim has a claim under the Code for which the
offender is liable. Although this debt is subject to imposition and modification by the court, it is nonetheless a debt under the Bankruptcy Code.
28, § 252(b)(6) (Supp. 1985); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.92.060 (Supp. 1986); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 973.09(Im)(a) (West 1985). Indeed, in Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Washington,
the victim is given a statutory right to restitution or to request that restitution be made.
See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611A.04(1) (West Supp. 1986); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, § 189-9.3(2)
(Purdon Supp. 1985); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.69.030(13) (Supp. 1986).
57. See supra note 37.
58. See, e-g., Ala. Code § 15-18-65 (1982); Idaho Code § 19-5304 (Supp. 1985); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985), construed in People v. Neil, 99
Mich. App. 677, 680, 299 N.W.2d 23, 25 (1980); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.021(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1986); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-17-1 (1981), construed in State v. Lack, 98 N.M. 500,
505, 650 P.2d 22, 27 (1982); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 973.09(1)(b) (West 1985).
59. See, eg., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-204(2.5) (Supp. 1984); Iowa Code Ann. § 910.2
(West Supp. 1985); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 533.030(3) (Michie 1985); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 973.09(lm)(c) (West 1985).
60. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
61. See, eg., Ala. Code § 15-18-75 (1975); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2359 (Supp. 1985);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.089(8) (West Supp. 1986); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.030(3)(g)
(Michie 1985); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1327 (1982); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 611A.04(3) (West Supp. 1986); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-17(1) (Supp. 1985); Mont.
Code Ann. § 46-18-249 (1985); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:65 (Supp. 1983); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1343(d) (Supp. 1985); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08 (1985); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 973.09(7) (West 1985); Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-314 (Supp. 1985).
62. See State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 592, 362 A.2d 32, 34 (1976). In that case the
Court stated that "without prejudice to the right of any aggrieved party to seek to recover
damages in a civil action . . . we regard it as preferable in the ordinary case, where
feasible, to provide for restitution within the probation context." Id. at 592, 362 A.2d at
34.
63. See In re Brown, 39 Bankr. 820, 822-23 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
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Some authorities suggest that these obligations are not debts because
the victim has no right to enforce the payments.' This argument is unsound. There is no requirement in the definition of claim that the creditor hold a direct right 65 to enforce payment. 66 Rather, Congress
intended that "claim" be construed in the broadest possible manner 67 so

that all potential claims would be subject to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Nonetheless, in several states a victim has a direct right to enforce the restitution order as if it were a civil judgment 68 or a right to
request a hearing to enforce the payments.6 9 In these states, since the

victim has70 an express right to enforce the order, he has a clear right to

payment.
The remaining states are silent regarding victim enforcement. It
should be noted, however, that payments generally are made to a state
agency, which then disburses the payments to the victim. 7 ' A failure of
payment is reported to the court by the probation officer,72 who will seek
to enforce payment on behalf of the victim. Thus, although the state
participates in enforcing the debt, the victim retains the right to seek
enforcement of the obligation through a probation officer.73 This is a
64. See In re Vik, 45 Bankr. 64, 67 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); In re Pellegrino, 42

Bankr. 129, 132 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614, 616 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1983); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692, 694 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981).

65. "Direct right" in this context refers to the ability of a creditor to enforce payment
of an obligation as if it were a civil judgment.
66. See In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub nom. Kelly
v. Robinson, 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986).
67. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
68. See Ala. Code § 15-18-78(a) (Supp. 1985); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2354 (Supp.
1985); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.089(5) (West Supp. 1986); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-14-13(a)
(Supp. 1985); Idaho Code § 19-5305 (Supp. 1985); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 61 1A.04(3) (West
Supp. 1986); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08(l)(c) (1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§ 23A-28-1 (Supp. 1985); W. Va. Code § 61-1 IA-4(h) (1984).
69. See Ala. Code § 15-18-72(a) (1975); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-17-1(F) (1981); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 253(c) (Supp. 1985).
70. See In re Newton, 15 Bankr. 708, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
71. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.030(3)(b) (Michie 1985); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 17-A, § 1326 (1983); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 640(d)(3)(i) (Supp. 1984); Mont. Code
Ann. § 46-18-245 (1985); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:64 (Supp. 1983); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 22, § 99la(D) (West 1986); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1106(e) (Purdon 1983); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 12-19-34 (Supp. 1985); Va. Code § 19.2-305.1(C) (Supp. 1985); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 973.09(Im)(d) (West 1985).
72. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1329(2) (1983); Mont. Code Ann. § 4618-245 (1985); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.92.060 (Supp. 1986); see also In re Robinson,
776 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1985) ("the enforcement of the obligation [is] the responsibility
of ... state probation officers."), cert. granted sub noma. Kelly v. Robinson, 106 S. Ct.
1181 (1986).
73. See In re Brown, 39 Bankr. 820, 821-22 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
Because payments are made through a probation officer in many cases, he will be the

first to become aware of a failure of payment, making him the logical person to report the
failure to the court. Since the obligation runs to the victim, the probation officer's report
of the failure is done impliedly on behalf of the victim. Thus, a victim has sufficient
power to seek enforcement of the right of payment, albeit through a probation officer.
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sufficient enforcement right for bankruptcy purposes. 4
Consequently, since the obligation for restitution runs from the offender to the victim, the victim has a right to payment and a claim under
the Code's broad construction of these terms. The offender's liability
on
5
this claim therefore creates a debt cognizable in bankruptcy."
III.

A.

CONFLICT BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE INTERESTS

Bankruptcy Code and the State CriminalJustice System

Some authorities argue that discharging criminal restitution obligations frustrates the purposes of the state criminal justice system.' 6 How74. No right of enforcement is required by the Code. See In re Robinson, 776 F.2d
30, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1985), cert granted sub nom. Kelly v. Robinson, 106 S. Ct. 1181
(1986). Thus, if enforcement is an element at all, it should be defined broadly, consistent
with the broad construction of "claim" and "right to payment." Therefore, if the victim
has the power and the right to have something done about the offender's failure to pay, he
should have a "right to payment," The means of enforcement, whether it be garnishment
of assets or revocation of probation, is irrelevant. See id. at 38 ("The right is not the less
cognizable because the obligor must suffer loss of freedom rather than loss of property
upon failure to pay.").
75. Once a debt has been established, it will be discharged unless specifically excepted
in § 523 or § 727(a) of the Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
Debts incurred by certain kinds of wrongful conduct are expressly excepted. See id.
§ 523(a)(2) (debts incurred through fraud or through wrongful use of a statement in writing); id. § 523(a)(4) (debts incurred through fraud in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement
or larceny); id. § 523(a)(6) (debts incurred through willful and malicious conduct to another or the property of another). A creditor, however, must object to the discharge of
such a debt. See id. § 523(c). If the objection is made, then the bankruptcy court will
determine whether to discharge the debt. Id. Since characterization of a debt in bankruptcy is a federal question, see Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1923), only
the bankruptcy court can determine the issue of dischargeability. See In re Richardello,
28 Bankr. 344, 348 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); In re Barnett, 15 Bankr. 504, 510 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1981); In re Hoover, 14 Bankr. 592, 596 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 38 Bankr.
325 (N.D. Ohio 1983). However, if no objection is filed, these debts will be discharged
notwithstanding the stated exceptions. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (Supp. 11 1984).
It is well-established that these exceptions should be limited to those plainly expressed
and should be construed in favor of the debtor, see e.g., Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558,
562 (1915); In re Cross, 666 F.2d 873, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Marino, 29 Bankr.
797, 799 (N.D. Ind. 1983); In re Payne, 27 Bankr. 809, 817 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re
Norman, 25 Bankr. 545, 547 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy f 523.05A
(15th ed. 1985), since they inherently frustrate the purpose of bankruptcy by not discharging certain obligations of the debtor. See id. 523.05 n.3. The fact that the exceptions are to be construed only by a bankruptcy court indicates congressional intent to
preserve federal jurisdiction over the determination of debts. A state court's decision that
criminal restitution obligations are not debts would prevent these obligations from even
reaching the purview of the federal bankruptcy courts. This is plainly contrary to legislative intent. Placing criminal restitution obligations under the Code rightfully puts the
issue of their dischargeability in the federal courts and imposes on the creditor an aflirmative obligation to object to their discharge under § 523(c). Only in this way can a debtor
be given the best chance for a fresh start, pursuant to the purposes underlying
bankruptcy.
76. See In re Vik, 45 Bankr. 64, 68 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 21, Kelly v. Robinson, cert granted, 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986).
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ever, discharge actually meshes with the state system without usurping
its power to enforce its criminal laws.

State criminal courts have broad discretion in determining probation
conditions,77 including the imposition of restitution payments. Although
these payments are based initially on the amount necessary to compen-

sate the victim for his losses,7" the offender's ability to pay limits the

restitution obligation.7 9 Any obligation greater than that undermines re-

habilitation.

o

Courts may impose full, partial or no restitution at all,

based on the offender's ability to pay.8 1
In most cases, if the probationer fails to make payments, the court will
not revoke probation without a hearing to determine the reasons for the

failure and to reevaluate the amount of restitution.82 Some states specifi-

cally provide that probation will be revoked only on a finding of a wil-

ful8 3 or inexcusable 4 failure to pay. If a valid reason exists for the failure
to pay, the state has the power to modify or eliminate the obligation.85

77. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 37, 41 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4) (1983); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.089(6)
(West Supp. 1986); Pub. Act. No. 83-1061, § 1, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-5.6(f)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1325(1)(C) & (2)(D) (1983);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.3(5)(a) (West 1982); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-3(2)(a), (b)
(Supp. 1985); N.J. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2C:45-1(b)(8) (1982); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(2)(g)
(McKinney Supp. 1986); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-304(d) (1982); see also Bearden v.
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 669-70 (1983) (in considering restitution, a state court may consider the probationer's "employment history and financial resources"); D. Dressier, supra
note 5, at 241 ("Common sense dictates that such repayment ... be made when the
individual is earning enough to comply."); S. Schafer, Compensation and Restitution to
Victims of Crime 62 (2d ed. 1970) ("It is common ...to require [a probationer] to make
restitution ...in an amount which he is able to pay....").
80. See People v. Marx, 19 A.D.2d 577, 578, 240 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (1963) ("[Ilf the
suspension of the sentence is to be meaningful, the conditions of the defendant's probation must be such as are within the defendant's capacity to meet, in the light of his financial position and average earnings."); Commonwealth v. Wood, 300 Pa. Super. 463, 468,
446 A.2d 948, 950 (1982) ("The rehabilitative goal [of restitution] is defeated only when
the payments ordered... are so unreasonable in view of the defendant's financial circumstances and ability to work that, despite good faith efforts, the defendant cannot hope to
comply.").
81. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.030(3)() (Michie 1985); Md. Ann. Code art.
27, § 640(e) (1982); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-247(1) (1985); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 176,
189(4) (1985); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1106(f) (Purdon 1983); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code
Ann. § 42.12(B)(3d)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 973.09(3)(b) (West 1985).
83. See, e.g., Pub. Act No. 83-1061, § 1, IIl. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6(g) (SmithHurd Supp. 1985); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.3(5)(b) (West Supp. 1985); Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-37-5(2) (Supp. 1985).
84. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1328(1) (1983); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 651:66 (Supp. 1983); see also Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 42.12(B) (8)(c) (Vernon
Supp. 1986) (inability to pay is an affirmative defense); Va. Code § 19.2-305.1(D) (Supp.
1985) (unreasonable failure to pay).
85. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 948.03(4) (West Supp. 1986); La. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 896 (West 1984); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.3(5)(b) (West Supp. 1985);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-17-1(C) (1981); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1106(c)(3) (Purdon
1983); Va. Code § 19.2-304 (1975).
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In addition, the Supreme Court has mandated that probation may not be
revoked if the probationer has made reasonable efforts to pay. 6 Thus,
states will not create "debtor's prisons" for offenders who are unable to
continue payments.
Furthermore, state systems have means other than restitution to carry
out rehabilitation through probation. For instance, the court could order
an offender to support dependents, 7 undergo medical treatment, 8 remain employed,89 pay a fine to the state90 or enroll in school or vocational training.9 1 Courts could also order restitution in the form of
services for the benefit of the victim in lieu of monetary payments. 92 Discharging a debt in bankruptcy merely eliminates the offender's obligation93 to the victim, since the obligation for restitution runs to the victim
rather than to the state. 4 Because a discharge does not interfere with the
offender's conviction, the state can modify the conditions of probation to
further rehabilitation. Theoretically, no conflict with the Bankruptcy
Code should exist because restitution will not be imposed on an offender
who has no ability to pay. 95 However, when these situations do arise, a
discharge of this debt will not unduly interfere with the state's ability to
enforce its criminal laws and rehabilitate offenders since it has options
other than restitution that are unimpaired by a discharge. State policy is
defeated if restitution overburdens the offender since this would frustrate
the rehabilitative purposes of probation.9 6 Thus, the state's interests in
probation will not be frustrated by a discharge of a restitution obligation
in bankruptcy.
86. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667-70 (1983). A state
may not ... imprison a person solely because [the probationer] lacked the resources to pay [restitution] ....

[A] probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay his... restitution, and who has complied with the other conditions of probation, has demonstrated a willingness to pay his debt to society and an ability to conform his
conduct to social norms.

Id. at 667-68, 670.
87. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.55.100(a)(3) (1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(3)
(1985); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 948.03(1)(f) (West 1985); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-2-2(a)(4)
(Bums 1985); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(2)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
88. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.030(2)(d) (Michie 1985); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 35-38-2-2(a)(2) (Burns 1985); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(2)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
89. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(1) (1983); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 948.03(1)(c)
(Vest 1985); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(2)(c) (McKinney 1975); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.

§ 9754(c)(2) (Purdon 1982).
90. See, e.g., Pub. Act No. 83-1047, § 1, Ii. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-6-(b)(2) (SmithHurd Supp. 1985); Va. Code § 19.2-305 (Supp. 1985).
91. See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 706-624(2)(d) (Supp. 1984); Ind. Code Ann. § 3538-2-2(a)(1) (Bums 1985); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9754(c)(4) (Purdon 1982).
92. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1203(5) (Supp. 1985); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 533.030(3) (Michie 1985); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 651:62(V), 651:63 (Supp. 1983).
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
94. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 41-42, 81 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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"Our Federalism" and Younger v. Harris

The principles of "Our Federalism" were espoused by the Supreme
Court in Younger v. Harris,97 when the Court held that a federal court

should not enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution except in ex-

traordinary circumstances. 8 The holding in Younger was based on "a
proper respect for state functions ... and a . . . belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free
to perform their separate functions in their separate ways."9 9 The Court
expressly recognized a "sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
' ° The Younger principles have been
State and National Governments. '""
used to support a broad and somewhat vague notion that federalism bars
discharge.101 Younger, however, is inapplicable to the issue at hand.
A pending state criminal prosecution 0" is critical to the Younger doctrine.10 3 As the Court later stated, "[r]equiring the federal courts totally
to step aside when no state criminal prosecution is pending against the
federal plaintiff would turn federalism on its head.'
The Court's primary concern in Younger was to preserve the state's ability to prosecute
and determine liability under its own criminal laws. 10 5 In the present
issue, however, no one interferes with the state's ability to prosecute. A
discharge of a restitution obligation in bankruptcy merely eliminates the
offender's obligation to the victim, not to the state. 106 The conviction
remains intact. The bankruptcy court makes no attempt to pass judgment on the liability of the offender or to interpret the criminal laws
under which he has already been prosecuted and convicted. As one
court stated, the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to give "financial
97. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
98. See id. at 53-54. The extraordinary circumstances must constitute irreparable
harm such as bad faith or harassment, id., or an inadequate remedy in state court, id. at
43. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441-43 (1977); C. Wright, Law of Federal
Courts § 52A, at 323-24, 329 (4th ed. 1983).
99. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., In re Oslager, 46 Bankr. 58, 62 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985); In re Vik, 45
Bankr. 64, 68 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18-20, Kelly v.
Robinson, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986).
102. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). The Court in Younger described the
plaintiff in that case as involved in an "acute, live controversy with the State and its
prosecutor," see id., since the plaintiff had already been charged with a crime, but not yet
prosecuted, id. at 38-39. The concept of "pending" was later expanded by the Court to
include situations where a state criminal prosecution had begun after the federal complaint was filed, but before proceedings on the merits of the federal case had begun. See
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1975).
103. C. Wright, supra note 98, § 52A, at 325; see Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan,
406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972) ("The decisions [in Younger] were premised on considerations
of equity practice and comity in our federal system that have little force in the absence of
a pending state proceeding.").
104. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472 (1974).
105. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271
U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926)).
106. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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freedom, not freedom from criminal prosecution." '
A discharge of a
restitution obligation does in fact provide financial freedom for the offender while preserving the conviction. Because there is no interference
with the state's right to prosecute, the underlying concerns of Younger
are not threatened.
Criminal actions are excepted from the automatic stay that is issued
when the petition for bankruptcy is filed.1 8 It has been argued that this
exception, which is consistent with the principles of Younger,"' indicates
that Congress did not intend that criminal restitution obligations be considered debts."' The use of a stay provision in this context is misplaced. 1 The provision merely exempts the prosecution of criminal
actions from the automatic stay. More importantly, since it has been
shown that the discharge of a criminal restitution obligation does not
interfere with the state's right to prosecute, the Younger concerns underlying the exception are satisfied. Thus, the stay provision is irrelevant to
whether a restitution obligation can be considered a dischargeable debt
under the Code.
C. Bankruptcy and the Supremacy Clause
Under the supremacy clause," 2 laws enacted pursuant to the Constitu-3
tion can preempt the power of state courts to promote state interests.'
Since the bankruptcy courts were created pursuant to the Constitution,1 1 4 the supremacy clause applies. The Bankruptcy Code by its terms
provides for preemption of state law."1 5 Thus, it is clear that the bank107. In re Farrell, 43 Bankr. 115, 117 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982). This section provides that an automatic stay will
not apply to "the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding
against the debtor." Id. Courts that have used this section commonly quote the legislature's statement that "[tihe bankruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal offenders, but
are designed to give relief from financial overextension." Senate Report, supra note 10, at
51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5837.
109. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 362.05(1) (15th ed. 1985); see In re Brown, 39 Bankr.
820, 826-27 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
110. See In re Vik, 45 Bankr. 64, 65-66 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); In re Magnifico, 21
Bankr. 800, 802-03 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982).
111. See In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub noma. Kelly
v. Robinson, 106 S. CL 1181 (1986).
112. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
113. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824); U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
4; see also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971) (state legislation frustrating full
effectiveness of federal law rendered invalid by the supremacy clause).
114. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1982); id. § 362 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); see also Senate
Report, supra note 10, at 29, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5815
(legislative comments to 11 U.S.C. § 106 state, "[Congress] may exercise its bankruptcy
power through the supremacy clause to prevent or prohibit State action that is contrary
to bankruptcy policy"); Senate Report, supra note 10, at 51, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5837 (comments to 11 U.S.C. § 362 indicate that "this section
... [is] intended to be ... an assertion of the bankruptcy power over State governments
under the supremacy clause").
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ruptcy courts have the power to determine the dischargeability of debts
over the interests of the state.116
The bankruptcy courts also may abstain from hearing a case over
which they have jurisdiction." 7 Though there are few guidelines, 1 8 abstention is discretionary" 9 and must be exercised "sparingly and cautiously." 20 Cases based on unresolved questions of state law' 2' or on
areas that require a "particular expertise" that the bankruptcy courts do
not possess 1 22 will warrant abstention. The issue of whether to discharge
criminal restitution obligations only involves an interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code. Since this is purely a matter of federal concern,123 the

abstention provision is not implicated in this context.
D. Bankruptcy and the Anti-Injunction Act

Under the Anti-Injunction Act, 2 ' a federal court may not enjoin proceedings in a state court unless, inter alia, there is an express authoriza116. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971); see also International Shoe
Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) ("States may not pass or enforce laws to interfere
with or complement the Bankruptcy Act ... ."); Duffey v. Dollison, 734 F.2d 265, 267
(6th Cir. 1984) (the supremacy clause dictates that a conflict between bankruptcy and
state interests be resolved in favor of federal law); In re Erlin Manor Nursing Home, Inc.,
36 Bankr. 672, 677 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (if a state regulation conflicts with bankruptcy law, it is not valid in the bankruptcy context); In re Fidelity Standard Mortgage
Corp., 36 Bankr. 496, 499 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (bankruptcy law is unrestricted and
paramount and will preempt state law).
117. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)(1) (West 1985). This section provides that "[n]othing in
this section prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity
with State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11." Id.
118. 1 Collier on Bankruptcy I 3.01[3]a] (15th ed. 1985).
119. See Senate Report, supra note 10, at 154, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5787, 5940 (§ 1334(c) "permits" the courts to abstain); see also In re
Boughton, 49 Bankr. 312, 316 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1985) (§ 1334(c)(1) grants "discretionary
authority" to abstain); In re Lorren, 45 Bankr. 584, 589 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984) ("Section 1334(c)(1) is apermissive abstention provision") (emphasis in original); 1 Collier on
Bankruptcy I 3.01[31[a] (15th ed. 1985) (§ 1334(c)(1) gives the district court the discretion to abstain).
120. In re Lorren, 45 Bankr. 584, 589 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985); see In re G-N Partners, 48 Bankr. 459, 461 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (declining jurisdiction is "an extraordinary power" to be "exercised with extraordinary care."); In re Lafayette Radio Elecs.
Corp., 8 Bankr. 973, 976 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (abstention should be exercised only
under unusual or exceptional circumstances); In re Zamost, 7 Bankr. 859, 863 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1980) (abstention used only in exceptional circumstances); House Report, supra
note 2, at 51, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6012 (abstention was
invoked in Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940), which involved a
"particularly unusual" question of state law).
121. See Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1940); In re
Boughton, 49 Bankr. 312, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985); In re Zamost, 7 Bankr. 859, 862
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy I 3.01[3][a] (15th ed. 1985).
122. House Report, supra note 2, at 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5963, 6012; see In re Zamost, 7 Bankr, 859, 863 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
123. See Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924); In re Hoover, 14 Bankr.
592, 596 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio), affid, 38 Bankr. 325 (N.D. Ohio 1983). See supra note 75.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).

1986]

CRIMINAL RESTITUTION

tion of Congress. 125 The Bankruptcy Code expressly provides such an
authorization. 12 6 The Supreme Court also has acknowledged that bankruptcy is an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, allowing federal courts
to stay state proceedings that conflict with a federal bankruptcy proceeding.12 7 This further illustrates the power of the bankruptcy courts to
give the debtor a fresh start.
CONCLUSION

A criminal restitution obligation imposed as a condition of probation
is a debt contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code. Congress specifically
provided for a broad construction of the definitions of claim and debt in
order to give debtors financial relief. In the context of probation, restitution payments go to the victim and are part of the underlying debt of the
probationer to the victim, giving the victim a right to payment and a
valid claim. Because this obligation is in fact a debt, a victim is obliged
to file any objections to discharge in the bankruptcy proceeding so that
the debtor is given the broadest possible relief.
A discharge of this debt eliminates the obligation to the victim, rather
than to the state, and does not jeopardize the state's ability to prosecute
under its criminal laws. Thus, the Younger concern of preserving the
autonomy of the state criminal justice system is satisfied. Moreover, because federal courts have broad preemptive powers in the area of bankruptcy, they have the authority and the power to govern the
determination of debts. For these reasons, the conclusion that a criminal
restitution obligation is a debt contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code
best effectuates the fresh start purposes envisioned by Congress.
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